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NATURAL LAW AND
THE "IS"--"OUGHT"
QUESTION: AN
INVITATION TO
PROFESSOR VEATCH
JOHN FINNIS*

Henry Veatch's "sharp questions" are directed to those who deny
that morals and ethics have any basis in nature or the facts of nature; to
those who believe in a "wall of separation dividing 'is' from 'ought' and
facts from values"; to those who "insist that ethical principles can have
no grounding in fact and in nature"; to those who suppose an "absolute
independence of ethics as over against metaphysics, or of morals with respect to a knowledge of nature," so that "principles of morals and ethics
are really not to be thought [of] as being in any sense principles of being
or of nature at all"; and to those who "consider the human good as being
such an end or ends as human beings have an inclination towards" rather
than "the ends that truly perfect human beings."
Veatch's questions and objections, therefore, are not properly directed to either Germain Grisez or to myself. Neither Grisez nor I subscribe to any of the foregoing denials, affirmations, and suppositions; indeed, we reject them all. Neither of us has published anything which
might reasonably be interpreted, in its context, as involving or entailing
any such view. My invitation to Professor Veatch then, is twofold: first, to
read what we have written, strictly and fully; second, and more importantly, to examine some of the serious questions which my book' addresses to those who interpret Aquinas and Aristotle in Veatch's manner.2
Who would guess, from Veatch's polemic, that I reached the same
result in my book using the "Euthyphro test" as did Veatch. This was
* Reader in Law, Fellow and Praelector in Jurisprudence at the University College, Oxford.
J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).

See Mclnerny, The Principles of Natural Law, 25 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 1-15 (1980). But see
Finnis, G. Grisez, The Principles of Natural Law, 26 Am. J. JuRIs. 21 (1981).
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done prominently in the text of chapter III,- a chapter devoted to a detailed examination of the nature of judgments concerning human good, by
an exploration of our judgments regarding one particular basic human
good, knowledge, or truth.
The chapter began by distinguishing "desire or inclination or felt
want" from "grasp of value"-"value" signifying "the aspect under which
a particular objective has its interest, attracts desire, choice and efforts
and thus is (or is considered to be) a good thing."4 Understanding of
value was then shown to function as a principle of practical reasoning
since "it formulates a want but makes the want more than a blind urge by
referring its object . . . to the intelligible and general form of good which
that object is one possible way of participating in or instantiating."
I then turned to establish the "self-evidence of the good of
knowledge." 6 In denying that the good in question can be demonstrated
or inferred, I also denied that "there are no pre-conditions for recognizing
7
that value."
On the contrary, the value of truth becomes obvious only to one who has
experienced the urge to question, who has grasped the connection between
question and answer, who understands that knowledge is constituted by
correct answers to particular questions, and who is aware of the possibility
of further questions and of other questioners who like himself could enjoy
the advantage of attaining correct answers.8
To establish how I use the terms "infer" and "deduce," I added:
But one who, thus knowing the possibility of attaining truth, is enabled
thereby to grasp the value of that possible object and attainment is not
inferring the value from the possibility. No such inference is possible. No
value can be deduced or otherwise inferred from a fact or set of facts."'
Professor Veatch thinks that this usage of the terms "deduction" and "inference" is "somewhat straitened and overly technical." It seems to me a
desirable precision, whereby one does justice to both Aquinas' insistence
that basic principles of the form "X is a good to be pursued. . ." are per
se nota and indemonstrabilia,and to our contemporaries' reasonable insistence on the logically significant distinction between propositions
about what "is" and propositions about what "ought to be."' 0 This logical
FINNIS, supra note 1, at 59-80.
' Id. at 60-61.
5 Id. at 63.
" Id. at 64.
7 Id. at 65.
8Id.
9 Id. at 66.
10 E.g., H. VEATCH, FOR AN ONTOLOGY OF MORALS 119 (1971).
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distinction is not at all a "wall of separation." To make this clear I added
the following to the passage last quoted above: "Aquinas followed Aristotle's theory of the 'induction' of indemonstrable first principles by insight working on observation, memory, and experience, but extended the
account to a parallel 'induction' of indemonstrable first principles of practical reason (i.e. of natural law) by insight working on felt inclinations
'
This induction from experience could
and a knowledge of possibilities.""
of course be called a form of inference.1 2 Like many philosophers, therefore, I prefer to restrict the term "inference" to reasoning that moves
from one proposition or principle to another, so that my use of the term
would correspond to Aquinas' notion of the per se notum.
In any event, I proceeded to deny that one could infer the basic values from the fact that they are universally affirmed or desired, from the
fact that the corresponding desires manifest a deep structure of the mind,
are ineradicable, are common to all animals or are peculiar to human beings,"3 or from the fact that one feels certitude about them. 4 Then I
raised the "Euthyphro test."
The principle that truth is worth pursuing ... is thus an underived principle. Neither its intelligibility nor its force rests on any further principle.
This may tempt us to say that knowledge is a good because we desire it, are
interested in it, value it, pursue it. But the temptation has plausibility only
if we abandon the effort to understand the value of knowledge. And we are
tempted to abandon that effort only when, for bad philosophical reasons, we
confuse a principle's lack of derivation with a lack of justification or lack of
objectivity ....
[Flor one who considers something like knowledge to be a
good, the true expression of his opinion and attitude is not 'it is good because or in so far as I desire it' but 'I desire it because and in so far as it is
good.'

15

I then explained the potentially confusing Aristotelian tag "'the good is
what all things desire,' "16 concluding:
Those who used the tag were equally insistent that one's human desire is a
pursuit of something in so far as it seems desirable, and that things seem
desirable to one in so far as they (appear to) promise to make one better
off.

. .

. [For] one who is judging something to be good and desirable, his

desire and decision to pursue the object are consequential on his judgment:
(i) that the object is good and (ii) that he will really be better off for getting
j. FINNIs, supra note 1, at 77 (emphasis added).
H. VEATCH, ARISTOTLE 180 (1974).

12 See
13

J.

FINNIS,

supra note 1, at 66.

Id. at 69.
1 Id. at 70.
'6 Id. at 69-70.
'4
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17
or doing or effecting it."

The whole argument of my chapter was summed up in a passage that says
all Professor Veatch could reasonably want to hear about potentiality and
actuality:
It is obvious that a man who is well-informed, etc., simply is better-off
(other things being equal) than a man who is muddled, deluded, and ignorant, that the state of the one is better than the state of the other, not just
in this particular case or that, but in all cases, as such, universally, and
whether I like it or not. . . .For the understanding affirmation of the practical principle [that truth is a good-and mutatis mutandis for all the other
basic values] is neither a reference to nor an expression of any desire or urge
or inclination of mine. Nor is it merely a reference to (or implied presupposition of) any desires that my fellows happen to have. It goes beyond the
desires and inclinations which may first have aroused my interest in the
possibility of knowledge and which may remain a necessary substratum of
any interest in truth sufficient to move me to pursue it for myself. It is a
rational judgment about a general form of human well-being, about the fulfilment of a human potentiality."8
In an appended note headed "Objects are desired as desirable, and considered desirable as making one better-off," 1' I linked my idiomatic English "better-off" with the mature Thomistic texts such as Summa Theologiae.2 I quoted from the texts in which Aquinas employs this analysis
in relation to the good of knowledge. In later chapters, I settled for the
terms "flourishing," "well-being," and even "full-being" to do duty for
Aquinas' perfectio, Veatch's "actuality," and my own "better-off." Hence
basic goods are "basic aspects of human flourishing" or "forms of well-

being. "21
At a crucial moment of the book's argument, when I set out to show
how ethical or moral good is a participation in the basic good of practical
reasonableness, I formally stated the relation between good and being and
between ethics and human nature. I invite Henry Veatch to consider this
passage concerning the requirements of practical reasonableness:
Each of these requirements concerns what one must do, or think, or be if
one is to participate in the basic value of practical reasonableness. Someone
who lives up to these requirements is thus Aristotle's phronimos; he has
Aquinas's prudentia; they are requirements of reasonableness or practical
wisdom, and to fail to live up to them is irrational. But, secondly reasonableness both is a basic aspect of human well-being and concerns one's par17

Id. at 70-71.

18

Id. at 72.

19 Id. at 78-79.
20

Id.

"1

See id. at 23, 67, 87, 144.
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ticipation in all the (other) basic aspects of human well-being. Hence its
requirements concern fullness of well-being. . . .So someone who lives up
to these requirements is also Aristotle's spoudaios (mature man), his life is
eu zen (well-living) and, unless circumstances are quite against him, we can
say that he has Aristotle's eudaimonia (the inclusive all-round flourishing or
well-being-not safely translated as 'happiness'). But, thirdly, the basic
forms of good are opportunities of being; the more fully a man participates
in them the more fully he is what he can be. And for this state of being fully
what one can be, Aristotle appropriated the word physis, which was translated into Latin as natura. . . .So Aquinas will say that these requirements
are requirements not only of reason, and of goodness, but also (by entailment) of (human) nature. . . .Thus, speaking very summarily, we could say
that the requirements to which we now turn express the 'natural law
method' of working out the (moral) 'natural law' from the first (pre-moral)
'principles of natural law.' Using only the modern terminology (itself of uncertain import) of 'morality,' we can say that the following sections of this
chapter concern the sorts of reasons why (and thus
the ways in which) there
22
are things that morally ought (not) to be done.

III
Despite his assertions, it appears that Professor Veatch does not really believe that an "ought" can be inferred from a sheer "is." Veatch
notes that "the so-called inferences from 'is' to 'ought' or from nature to
norms, are nothing if not inferences from an 'is' that already involves an
'ought' . . . ." Veatch further adds, "the very 'is' of human nature has
been shown to have an 'ought' built into it." Indeed, it is impossible to
determine what a human being is, without making reference to what he
ought to be-or to that natural end or fulfillment or good, which it is
incumbent upon any human being (by nature) to try to be or become.
I quite agree. I invite Henry Veatch to consider this: does not his
view that a full knowledge of human nature involves a knowledge of what
is "incumbent upon" human beings suggest that, epistemologically, a
knowledge of what is good for human beings, and thus incumbent upon
them, is a condition precedent to any full knowledge of human nature. I
invite him to consider the question I raised in the notes to the very pages
on which he commented:
It is true that the natural law theory of, say, Aristotle and Aquinas goes
along with a teleological conception of nature and, in the case of Aquinas,
with a theory of divine providence and eternal law. But what needs to be
shown is that the conception of human good entertained by these theorists
is dependent upon this wider framework."
22 Id.

at 102-03.
" Id. at 52.
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It cannot be said that Veatch's comments confront this challenge, despite
my attempt to provoke such a confrontation in the next sentence:
There is much to be said for the view that the order of dependence was
precisely the opposite-that the teleological conception of nature was made
plausible, indeed conceivable, by analogy with the introspectively luminous,
self-evident structure of human well-being, practical reasoning, and human
purposive action ...."I
My emphasized reference to the "introspectively luminus" is an allusion
to the section of text so singly omitted from Veatch's quotations of that
particular page:
The basic forms of [human good) grasped by practical understanding are
what is good for human beings with the nature they have. Aquinas considers
that practical reasoning begins not by understanding this nature from the
outside, as it were, by way of psychological, anthropological, or metaphysical observations and judgments defining human nature, but by experiencing
25
one's nature, so to speak, from the inside, in the form of one's inclinations.
It is regrettable the way the last sentence ended. Readers might be left
with the impression that the relevant understanding of one's nature is
found in the experience of inclinations alone. Such an impression would
be incorrect and non-Thomistic. My meaning is conveyed in the last of
the three sentences which immediately followed:
But again, there is no process of inference. One does not judge that 'I have
[or everybody has] an inclination to find out about things' and then infer
that therefore 'knowledge is a good to be pursued'. Rather, by a simple act
of non-inferential understandingone grasps that the object of the inclination which one experiences is
an instance of a general form of good, for
2
oneself (and others like one).
As stated at the beginning of the chapter on basic values other than the
good of knowledge, to ask oneself whether there are indeed such other
basic values "is, in a way, an attempt to understand one's own

. . .

na-

ture. 127 Where, then, do I disagree with Veatch's thesis that adequate
judgments concerning human nature "involve," "build right in," or "in24

Id.

Id. at 34 (footnote omitted).
" Id. (emphasis added).
2

27

1

added:

The attempt thus parallels attempts made, in quite another way, by those anthropologists and psychologists who ask (ineffect) whether there is a human nature
and what are its characteristics. The anthropological and psychological studies ought
to be regarded as an aid in answering our present question-not, indeed, by way of
any 'inference' from universality or 'human nature' to values (an inference that would
be merely fallacious), but by way of an assemblage of reminders of the range of possibly worthwhile activities and orientations open to one. Id.
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corporate" judgments about man's "natural end or fulfillment or good,"
about "what he ought to be" and what "it is incumbent" upon any human
being to be? The disagreement is this: I assert that judgments of the latter sort are primarily (though perhaps not exclusively) judgments of practical reason or practical science. Veatch asserts that they are all exclusively theoretical and not practical. Like so many interpreters of Aquinas
and Aristotle, he believes that practical reason serves to tell us how the
good may best be attained once it has been determined, . . . and that
therefore to determine what the good is can only be the work of theoretical reason.
I have many objections to Veatch's claim that the basic aspects of
human good are identified only by theoretical reason and that practical
reason is limited to identifying means to the ends which theoretical reason has identified. I will indicate and illustrate my principal philosophical
objection and will then briefly refer to some reasons for why Veatch's
view is opposed by Aristotle and Aquinas.
In all that follows, I take as a given Aquinas' mature thesis that there
is only one human reason, only one human intellectual potency or faculty,
and that the differences between speculative and practical reason are differences between intellectual operations with differing objectives. Additionally, one should bear in mind that "speculative" (or "theoretical")
and "practical" are analogous terms' s There are paradigm cases of purely
speculative and purely practical intellectual activity but most actual reasoning is both speculative and practical.
It seems that one's primary understanding of human good and what
is worthwhile for humans to have, do, and be is attained when one considers what it is good to be, have, and do and thus what it is (or would be)
worthwhile to have, do, and be. Such consideration, however, is what is
meant by "practical thinking"; simpliciter, when the consideration is of
my own human predicament with a view towards undertaking my own
commitments and actions here and now; secundum quid (but still primarily), when the consideration is more reflective, reviewing my present
commitments and past actions, contemplating possible future commitments and actions, assessing the commitments, actions, and character of
other persons. Hence, our primary grasp of human good, human fulfilment, and of what is "incumbent on" a human being to be is practical-which is not to deny that understanding can be integrated into a
28 Unless this is borne in mind, Aquinas' use of the terms will be found merely self-contra-

dictory. Compare AQUINAS I, q. 14, a. 16c: "Intellectus practicus ordinatur ad finem operatonis; finis autem intellectus speculativi est consideratio veritatis" with q. 79, a. 11 and 2:
"objectum intellectus practici est bonum ordinabilead opus, sub ratione veri. Intellectus
enim practicus veritatem cognoscit, sicut speculativus: sed veritatem cognitam ordinat ad
opus. "1
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metaphysical account of human nature as one nature amongst others.
My contention can conveniently be illustrated by a brief consideration of Henry Veatch's argument, advanced in his helpful book, Aristotle,29 which identifies man's natural good, function, perfection, and fulldevelopment as living in accordance with reason. It must be remembered
that in Veatch's view, this argument is exclusively speculative: practical
thought takes off from but cannot constitute or even contribute to this
prior theoretical determination of the end and good of human life. But let
us examine Veatch's argument:
(1) [M]an's function, or man's perfection or full-development, does indeed
consist in ... his living in the manner of someone with knowledge and understanding, and (2) .

.

. it is just this end that all men do strive for and

that is consequently the source of their true happiness and satisfaction. For
as regards (1), would we not all acknowledge that however healthy or fully
developed a human being might be in a narrowly physical or biological
sense, and however well he might be provided for in his ordinary needs and
desires, if in general he acted and behaved in a way that was no better than
a fool, we should hardly say that such a person's existence was quite what
we would consider to be a full or proper existence for a human being. Similarly, as regards (2), imagine yourself in a situation where you would be
offered all of the usual and perhaps unusual necessities and even goods of
life .

.

. but at the price of not having any genuine knowledge or under-

standing either of yourself or of the nature of things generally-that is to
say, at the price of your not asking any questions ... and so of your not
really knowing the what or the why of anything. Would you settle for this?
Presumably not. But, then, is not Aristotle right in his insistence that the
good or final cause of human life is precisely the intelligent life . . ?30
The structure and thrust of this argument makes it quite clear that
knowledge of the human telos and good is attained not by asking what
"all men do strive for," nor even by asking in a purely theoretical sense
what is a "full and proper existence for a human being." Rather, the argument works as a determination of that full and proper existence, precisely by prompting one to "imagine yourself in a particular situation,"
and then asking the question, "Would you settle for this?" In other
words, the argument compels one to acknowledge the metaphysical proposition concerning human nature through consideration of a question that
is hypothetical, but nonetheless practical."'The argument would work in
just the same way if the question were not hypothetical but required a
choice here and now between the alternative lives. This shows that its
hypothetical nature has no effect on its radically practical character.
H. VEATCH, ARISTOTLE (1974).
80 Id. at 106-07 (emphasis added).

See J. FINNIs, supra note 1, at 95-97.
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Aristotle considers the end and good of man in his Ethics. Does not
Aquinas repeatedly state that Aristotle's politics and ethics are expositions of practical science? Neither Aquinas nor Aristotle seem to hold the
view of Veatch (and so many other neoscholastics) that the practical part
of ethics and politics only begins after a theoretical determination of the
human end and good. In their view, ethics and politics are practical-from their first principles to their specific recommendations for actions and motivations, and beyond that to the applications that you and I
make in our choices here and now.
Aristotle is notoriously unclear with respect to the first principles of
ethics and politics. Veatch recognizes that Aristotle's "theoretical" arguments for identifying the end and function of man are unconvincing. He
reports Aristotle's argument that end is identified by identifying what is
peculiar to man but rightly passes over that argument without comment
and replaces it with the essentially practical and relatively convincing argument which I quoted above. That practicalargumentation strategy corresponds more closely to Aristotle's usual procedure in his ethics and
politics.3
I Aquinas is much more explicit than Aristotle with respect to the first
principles of practical reasoning, including ethics and politics. He forth33
rightly rejects the view of so many of his commentators (and of Veatch)
that practical reason and its particular virtue, prudentia, are concerned
only with particulars (not universal truths) and means (not the identification of ends). These principiaare comprehended by an intellectual disposition which he called synderesis." Having identified this primary aspect
of practical reason, he can use the term prudentia (which we have seen
him use to signify practical reason in all its aspects) to specifically signify
the application of principles to relatively particular problems of conduct.
The intellectual contents of synderesis-the first principles of practical reason-are expounded by Aquinas in his treatise on law, beginning
with the article to which Germain Grisez and I so often return, and which
will not now be expounded.35 As Aquinas makes clear, practical reason's
grasp naturaliterapprehendit of the human goods which correspond to
the objects of natural human inclinations is a grasp of the ends of human
existence. The first principles of natural law are an identification (indeed,
the primary identification) of the ends of human life and thus of the fines
moralium virtutum quia finis se habet in operabilibussicut principium
31

See generally J.

MONAN, MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND ITS METHODOLOGY IN ARISTOTLE 60-143

(1968).
33

E.g., H.

3

THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I 79, 12 &

35

VEATCH, ARISTOTLE 111 (1974).

Id. at I-II 94, 2.

1 47, 6, 1.
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in speculativis.36 It cannot be denied that Aquinas' treatise on man's
"last end" is not well integrated with his treatise on natural law and the
first principles of practical reason. The former treatise is theology, not
metaphysics but it is too easily read as a work of purely, or at least primarily, speculative reasoning. Appearances however, are deceptive. In my
view, the argumentative strategy of Aquinas' long determination of what
constitutes human perfectio or beatitudo is essentially the strategy of
Henry Veatch's argument which I quoted and discussed at length above.
At the outset an "objector" contends that "since beatitudo is man's ultimus finis, it exists in whatever is most dominating in human desire in
hominis affectu." Aquinas replies to this in a way which reveals his
methodolgy: "It is to wise people, not to fools, that we should look for
judgment about human goods (just as we should look to those with 'good
taste' for judgment about flavours. '3 7 Aquinas and Aristotle, of course,
frequently reserve the terms sophia/sapientia/wisdom for the purely
speculative/theoretical knowledge of the ultimate explanation of things.
The sapientes, however, to whose good judgment Aquinas appeals in
identifying the human good, are surely those to whom he appeals in the
very first words of his commentary on the Ethics: "sapientis est
ordinare." The ordo considered in moral philosophy is the order of voluntary actions. So the sapientia in question is not sapientia simpliciter but
that sapientia in rebus humanis which Aquinas calls prudentia, and
which pertains "solely to practical reason."' In summary, we find the
consideratio of the end of human existence in the philosophical treatise
which Aquinas reckons is practical. So, too, in his own theological treatise
on man's last end, Aquinas' methodological appeal to judgment of the
wise is an invitation to the reader to ask himself: What would I consider
sensible and what silly in choices of whole lives?3 9
Confronted by the embarrassing fact that Aquinas affirms that practical reason has its own basic principles which are simply indemonstrabiliaand per se (not per metaphysicam) nota, Henry Veatch believes
that we must invoke certain principles from metaphysics in order to clarify and explain what is meant by the term good as it appears in those
basic practical principles.
I am in favor of metaphysics as part of (and in a sense the fundamental part of) the great search for clarification and explication. I devoted
more than a chapter of my book on natural law to just such an explication. I frankly called it "not practical but theoretical or metaphysical," 4
Id. at I-II 47, 6c.
Id. at I-I 2, 1, 1.
Id. at II
47, 2.
39 See J. FINNIS, supra note 1 at
66-67.
40 Id. at 49, 371, 378.
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and I claimed that answers to the theoretical or metaphysical questions
there considered are necessary if there is to be any fully satisfactory an41
swer to the deepest practical questions about the topic of human goods.
I also claimed-and this is what Veatch seems to object to-that just as
"a good explanation of molecular motion can be provided"'42 without explaining the entire universe or the dependence of the universe and of molecular motion on the uncaused cause, "so too . . . natural law can be
'
understood, assented to, applied, and reflectively analysed' without exploring the metaphysical questions to which I have referred.
Veatch pretends he is a "'rustic' who does not quite see the selfevident nature of [the] first principle of practical reason," since as St.
Thomas was careful to point out, "a principle may be evident in itself,
and yet not evident to us." Veatch's phrase is regrettably ambiguous: "the
important thing about a self-evident proposition is that people (with the
relevant experience, and understanding of terms) assent to it without
needing the proof of argument; it matters not at all whether they further
recognize it as belonging to the relatively sophisticated philosophical category, 'self-evident.'"" I assume Veatch's rustic is supposed to wonder
not about the self-evidence of the basic practical principles but about the
principles themselves: "What do they mean? Are they true?"
I do not believe in Veatch's rustic who does not understand what
"good" means but who could be illuminated by being told some "principles from metaphysics"-that good is "being, considered as just the actuality toward which a given potentiality is ordered, as to its proper fulfillment or completion or actuality." That metaphysical "principle" is true,
and thus relevant to the subject matter. It is not, however, "relevant to"
the imagined rustic: it is not necessary to an answer to his supposed
question.
The proposition I advanced in the passages quoted by Veatch was
simply this: the basic principles of natural law can all be intelligently
grasped without adverting to metaphysical principles concerning the universal relationship between being and good, or about human nature in its
relation to divine and cosmic natures. I simply gave serious consideration
to Aquinas' frequently repeated claim that even rustics understand the
natural law." Since, in postulating his rustic, Veatch appeals to the authority of Aquinas, I fall to understand why he makes no response
whatever to the following challenge I have formulated:
Natural law, or morality, can be understood,assented to and applied with41

Id. at 371-73, 378, 405-10.

4'

Id. at 49.

4I

Id.

41 Id.

at 31.

'5 Id. at 30.
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out knowledge of metaphysics or anthropology ...Aquinas, S.T. I-II, q.
58, a. 4c is very clear: no one can be morally upright without (a) an understanding of the first principles of practical reasoning and (b) the practical
reasonableness (prudentia)which brings those principles to bear, reasonably, on particular commitments, projects, actions; but one can indeed be
morally upright without speculative (i.e. theoretical, 'is' -knowledge) wisdom
[sapientia, evidently stricto sensu], without the practical knowledge of a
craftsman (art), and without speculative knowledge (scientia)."
If my work and that of Grisez is as influential as Veatch maintains it is,
in reviving some philosophical respect for natural-law theory, it is simply
because we have pressed our readers to acknowledge their own grasp of
principia naturaliter (but not innately) nota which Aquinas says they
have, even though they lack metaphysical or anthropological theories.
Only after we have achieved that acknowledgment, and explored its
moral implications do we endeavor to explain how the goods thus acknowledged are aspects of a being which participates in the four orders of
created being. This pedagogical order of priorities seems to be more faithful to the content of Aristotle's and Aquinas' theories of ethical knowledge. It has the disadvantage, I acknowledge, of requiring the reader'to
attend to more than occasional sentences in fragments of our respective
works.

16

Id. at 52.

